It is influenced by different feminist critiques of autonomy, and as is outlined below, it is premised on the idea that current understandings of autonomy in law do not represent the ways in which people exercise autonomy. As Jennifer Nedelsky puts it: 'If we ask ourselves what actually enables people to be autonomous, the answer is not isolation, but 15 relationships ' . 18 In the context of religious tribunals, placing these relationships front and centre provides a different perspective on the way in which tribunals are engaged with by individuals. This article will argue that relational autonomy is therefore a useful approach to employ and considers Jonathan Herring's application of the concept to family law matters.
Applying relational autonomy to the issue of religious tribunals for the first time, it will be argued that relational autonomy ultimately focuses on the limitations on an individual's ability to exercise autonomy as a result of various pressures in relationships, or other wider contextual constraints. This is a major step forward but is not by itself sufficient. As a result, it is argued that elements of relational autonomy should be merged with another theoretical approach known as relational contract theory. The combined approach is named Feminist
Relational Contract Theory (FRCT) and was initially developed in Prenuptial Agreements and the Presumption of Free Choice: Issues of Power in Theory and Practice as a theory that
emphasises the contractual elements of relationships and the way power is exercised in such relationships. 19 We close by exploring the possibility of applying FRCT to religious tribunals and the minorities within minorities debate.
Different Understandings of Autonomy
The word 'autonomy' (or variants of) was not mentioned by Rowan Williams in his lecture.
To date, the concept has mostly arisen in the context of the religious tribunal debate in relation to the autonomy of the religious group. groups justifying State inaction. 22 Chief Justice Roberts held that, 'the interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission'. 23 He held that to treat ministers of religion as employees 'interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs' and that this was a line that the Supreme
Court was unwilling to cross. 24 This focus upon the autonomy of religious groups has been developed to suggest that their autonomous nature can be seen as a definitional attribute suggesting that the use of the term HALOs (Heterogeneous Autonomous Legal Orders) in place of religious law on the basis that the term religious law excludes non-religious systems of law and often gives the impression of referring to only to the 'revealed' laws found in sacred texts and not the norms, rules and laws generated, interpreted and applied by religious groups as a means to facilitate and order their day to day life. 25 In family law, however, the concept of autonomy has arisen in a different way. One of the most important recent developments has been the focus on individual autonomy as a proxy for modern family justice because it is assumed that it is better for individuals to control the legal consequences of their own relationships. Jonathan Herring has highlighted this traditional 'individualist conception of autonomy' as involving 'a claim that individuals should be allowed to make decisions for themselves and that those decisions should be respected by others, unless the decision involves harming someone else'. 26 He argued that such notions of autonomy have become prevalent in government policy, popular culture and in family law given the liberalisation of divorce laws and development of other forms of 22 The existence of a 'ministerial exception' was unanimously approved meaning that ministers of religion were not to be treated as employees and therefore could not benefit from legal rights that employees enjoy such as anti-discrimination laws. 'At the heart of that significant change, is the need to recognise the weight that should now be given to autonomy, and thus to the choices made by the parties to a marriage.
. 27 In terms of popular culture he rather oddly refers to the way in which 'many of the fictional heroes of our day: Jack Bauer, James Bond, Jason Bourne fight alone against the wicked powers that be: they are the epitome of the isolated autonomous man': ibid 2. 28 On which see S Thompson, above n 17. 29 the reluctance to accept the role of religious tribunals in determining disputes is perplexing.
She wrote that:
'Given this trend away from court adjudication (and even lawyer-assisted bargaining in the shadow of the court), it is hard to see why religious tribunals should not be as suitable as any other potential mediator or arbitrator to assist the parties in reaching a settlement that suits them, even if that settlement is one that reflects cultural or religious norms at odds with those of secular society'.
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For Douglas, the neo-liberal roll back of the State and the active role religious groups have in a number of areas, such as education, render the controversy surrounding the use of religious tribunals for dispute resolution surprising. She went as far as to argue that 'it would be both hypocritical and paradoxical to single out religious groups and religious tribunals to be barred from assisting their adherents from obtaining the remedies that the State's legal system is no longer prepared to provide for them'. 37 Douglas' work underscores how the debate on religious tribunals can be enhanced by placing it 'within the context of wider social developments concerning the family, and policy initiatives for the de-juridification of family disputes'. 38 The next two sections of this article will explore this claim further: the next section will explore the benefit of placing the religious tribunals debate within trends in family law generally, while the section following that will return to the work of Herring exploring his notion of 'relational autonomy' and its potential application in relation to religious tribunals.
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Religious Tribunals in the Context of Changes in Family Law
Family law is always an area in flux, more so than most areas of law. This is because social, 
The Argument for Relational Autonomy
The work of Herring proposes an alternative conceptualisation of autonomy which he claims is more suitable for family law matters. While he notes that 'independence and freedom have become the icons of our age', he claims that 'in the context of family law they are false gods'. 50 He suggests an alternative conceptualisation of autonomy -'relational autonomy'-which is defined in opposition to individualised autonomy: it stresses how our identities are 48 On which see R Sandberg, Religion, Law and Society (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 49 G Douglas, above n 33, 54. 50 J Herring, above n 24, 2.
constantly shaped and re-shaped through the relationships we form with others. 51 Approaches based upon relational autonomy have been employed (particularly by feminists) for some time. 52 Herring, applying the concept in relation to family law, emphasises how 'we find our identity and meaning through relationships' and those seemingly autonomous choices (concerning 'our wishes for our lives') 'can only be found by sharing our ideas, aspirations and hopes with others'. 53 It is 'a model of autonomy which is built around the support of relationships'. 54 Such an approach rejects the modern emphasis upon individualised autonomy where 'the law's role is to enable to be free from outside interference, to only be subject to those obligations that they have chosen to undertake'. 55 Rather: 'people are understood as relational, interconnected and interdependent. The law's job is to uphold and maintain relationships and to protect people from the abuses that can occur within them'. Herring argues that 'relational autonomy will seek an active role for the state in forging policies that bolster and support relationships'.
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Herring argues that relational autonomy is particularly applicable in relation to family life which 'is not about separation and self-sufficiency. It is about pooling talents and resources to work together for the good of the family'. 57 He writes that in relation to family law 'we need a law which fosters relationships; which acknowledges that relationships, particularly relationships of care, are essential to our societal well-being; and protects people from the disadvantages that flow from relationships'. 58 This could also apply to religious relationships.
Traditional religion law approaches that focus on the autonomy of religious groups are insufficient since they focus on the group and ignore individual members: they give little protection to the agency of those who use religious tribunals and risk discriminating against minorities within minorities. Conventional family law approaches stressing individual autonomy would also be deficient for the opposite reason in that they focus on individual members and ignore their status and constraints as group members: they protect only the right 51 Ibid 11. For further discussion of the nature of identities in the context of religion and legal pluralism see R Sandberg, above n 23, first, the law should not protect 'oppressive relationships which undermine autonomy by depriving a party of the opportunity to form their own aspiration and visions of their life' and second, the law should only protect 'thick' relationships, that is, those 'marked by care and deep interdependence'. Relational autonomy, therefore, emphasises the need to take into account gender inequalities and the need not to protect oppressive relationships. As Herring points out, 'a relational autonomy perspective is more aware than traditional autonomy of the way relationships can impair autonomy' and this raises the challenge 'to define how we determine which relationships a model of autonomy should promote and which it should regard as destructive of autonomy'.
Once oppressive relationships are excluded, the question remains of which relationships should be supported. In the context of religious tribunals, a debate can be had as to whether all forms of religion should be protected and whether the protection ought to be extended to non-religious and cultural groups. 63 One could take the view that all non-oppressive religious relationships can be supported unless they deal with matters outside the group's competence (such as matters concerning criminal sanctions or children). 64 Herring's suggested test of determining where relationships are 'thick' would, however, shift the focus away from the status of the tribunal (including the nature of the decision) towards the relationship between the member and the group. That said, it is likely that the relationship will be seen as sufficiently thick in most cases where there has been a long-term interdependence by virtue of the member's adherence. The question of which relationships (or which tribunals / legal actions), therefore, remains a major unresolved aspect that would need to be developed if relational autonomy was to be applied to the religious tribunals debate. There are two further unresolved issues with Herring's application of relational autonomy.
The first is terminological. From Herring's work it is clear that the key word in the phrase 'relational autonomy' is 'relational' not 'autonomy'. Discussion of autonomy is clearly preferable to talking of consent in that there can be grades of autonomy but it remains an imperfect term. The prevalent understandings of autonomy in religion law and family law pollute the term. Moreover, as a matter of logic it cannot be said that both the group and the member are completely autonomous. The term 'relational autonomy' is in a sense a paradox:
it instantly recognises by definition that complete autonomy cannot be achieved since we are all shaped and limited by our social interactions with one another. The second unresolved issue relates to application. In Relational Autonomy and Family Law, Herring explained how relational autonomy could be usefully applied within family law with particular reference to the laws on prenups, adolescent medical decision making and domestic abuse. Surprisingly, in so doing Herring depicted relational autonomy as a rather blunt instrument. 65 In a brief mention to mediation, he strangely argued that relational autonomy would oppose unregulated mediation (despite the fact that it is unclear who would favour completely unregulated mediation). 66 He then asserted correctly that a relational autonomy approach would highlight whether there were power inequalities within the process. He wrote that 'an understanding of the power relationships between the parties mean that we have to acknowledge the vulnerabilities of the parties to manipulation and exploitation within the mediation process'. However, he then seems to suggest that any suspicion of the possibility of an adverse power relationship would mean that agreements would not be enforced: 'A strong argument against the enforcement of prenuptial agreements can be made from the perspective of relational autonomy'. 67 He writes that this is because 'only very rarely can 65 That said, his application in the context of adolescent decision-making and domestic abuse raise a number of useful points such as the acknowledgment that 'the interests of parents and children are intertwined' and that the response needed should come down 'a response which is sensitive to the particular child and relational context' and that domestic abuse should be regarded 'not as a series of discreet acts of violence, but a relationship marked by coercion and control' and this explains 'why an intervention is justified, even when the victim of abuse is not seeking official protection' : J Herring, above n 24, 56, 60. However, even here, relational autonomy seems to amount to little more than placing the issue in context. 66 He wrote, 'An approach based on relational autonomy would, therefore, have some scepticism about the move to unregulated mediation. 
Towards Feminist Relational Contract Theory
Herring's major contribution in his work on relational autonomy is its emphasis upon the importance of relationships. The reason the concept of relationships is of central importance in family law is that it provides a framework in which responsibilities, obligations, rights and entitlements are both created and reinforced. This, in turn, impacts on the legal consequences of distinct categories of relationship, such as the relationship of parent and child, or spouses.
This is equally true of religion law. Indeed, it has been argued elsewhere that religion law can be defined in the same way as family law. For Gillian Douglas, 'the essence of family law is that part of the law which is concerned with the recognition and regulation of certain family relationships and the implications of such recognition'. 77 Following this, religion law has been defined as the part of the law concerned with the recognition and regulation of certain religious relationships. conceptually similar, but importantly an application of relational contract theory to religious tribunals could potentially produce a very different outcome. This is because of the theory's focus on contract instead of autonomy. When relational autonomy is the starting point for assessing arrangements in the context of religious tribunals, arrangements are less likely to be upheld as a result of the many pressures and circumstances that taint one's ability to exercise autonomy. At first glance, this would seem to be a preferable approach to one based on contract. As Herring argues, 'we cannot reduce caring obligations or compensation for losses caused by caring into some rigid formula, such as contract.' 79 However, this is assuming a legalistic understanding of contract. A relational approach to contract actually enables the flaws with orthodox contractual approaches to be highlighted, which in turn allows the assumptions made about the way individuals make decisions to be questioned.
Moving away from orthodox legalistic approaches to contract allow the potential of contract to be harnessed. As Martha Fineman has put it: relational autonomy with relational contract theory to produce a new approach that is focused on the power dynamic between parties to an agreement and between individuals and the wider institutions to which they belong.
Relational Contract Theory
Relational contract theory was primarily developed by Ian Macneil. 82 He criticised orthodox contract for its focus on agreements as discrete one-off transactions, and for failing to recognise the relationships between the parties, as he argued that these relationships This means that, although the courts of the State are reluctant to become involved in adjudicating internal disputes within religious groups, they will exceptionally intervene to enforce the laws of a religious group where there is a financial interest and in relation to the disposal and administration of property. This exception to the rule may be styled the authority which has inflicted the alleged injury.' Moreover, due to the doctrine of consensual compact, where the secular courts do this they will adjudicate the matter by reference to the rules and regulations of the religious group. As Lord Cranworth held in Forbes v Eden 92 ,where courts intervene with regard to the disposal and administration of property they 'must necessarily take cognizance of … the rules of a religious association'. In Shergill v Khaira 93 the Supreme Court stated that: 'The governing bodies of a religious voluntary association obtain their powers over its members by contract. They must act within the powers conferred by the association's contractual constitution'. This suggests that a relational contract approach to religious tribunals would be fitting given that the member's agreement to comply with the rules and rulings of the religious group is already understood under State law to be contractual.
There are examples of civil courts not only applying religious rules as terms of a contract but also applying religious agreements as contracts. The Cardiff research found that the religious tribunals studied were determining questions of religious status and Bowen has correctly said that 'granting an Islamic divorce has no legal effect in and of itself, and so the language of contracts and enforcement does not belong there'. 94 However, as he notes, there has been 'a partial opening of courts towards private arbitration of divorce, and even to arbitration conducted by religious bodies'. 95 Civil courts have approved agreements reached by arbitration that covers financial and property disputes arising from relationship breakdown. Court endorsed the parties proposal on the basis that 'the outcome, although likely to carry considerable weight with the court, would not be binding and would not preclude either party from pursuing applications to this court in respect of any of the matters in issue'. 101 The subsequent arbitration agreement was upheld by the court but Baker J was insistent that this it did not 'necessarily follow that a court would be content in other cases to endorse a proposal that a dispute concerning children should be referred for determination by another religious authority. Each case will turn on its own facts'.
In S v S
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Civil courts have also enforced nuptial agreements made in a religious context. Bowen discusses two cases that concern whether agreements to give a marriage gift can be enforced following the breakup of the marriage. 103 In the first case, Shahnaz v Rizwan 104 a couple married in India with a marriage agreement that stipulated payment on divorce. Winn J held that 'the right to dower, once it has accrued as payable, is a right in action, enforceable by a civil action without taking specifically matrimonial proceedings' and could be enforced as a 'proprietary right'. 105 Bowen argues that framing it as a proprietary right 'insulated the mahr agreement' against the objection that 'the agreement was a kind of pre-or ante-nuptial contract'. 106 For Bowen, this was unsatisfactory since regarding it as a contractual obligation would require judges 'to know the parties's understandings, including whether the parties 'religious marriage contracts', 114 noting that such agreements would be enforceable in the same way prenups meeting the qualifying criteria would be. The Law Commission justified their reluctance to give religious agreements special protection on the basis that providing more or less legal protection by virtue of being a member of a faith group 'would be discriminatory' and that 'Those who wish to make, and to abide by, religious marriage contracts will always be free to do so subject to the constraints of the legal obligations and to society as a whole'.
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However, Bowen criticises the adoption of a contractual analysis on the basis that it takes 'Islamic law to be a set of contract-orientated rules, independent of social context' 116 This further suggests the need for an approach based on relational contract theory. Such an approach can apply to religious groups generally in that membership of religious groups is seen as contractual (both legally and socially) but can also be applied in relation to religious agreements which now seem to be capable to be enforced in the same way as a prenup.
However, just because religious agreements are legally treated as being contractual, that does not mean that a contractual analysis is necessarily the best way of understanding them, Since relational contract theory was developed by Macneil in the commercial sphere, it is arguably not entirely appropriate for application to religious tribunals. For instance, relational contract theory might not be sensitive enough to the numerous power imbalances experienced by minorities within minorities, particularly on gender lines. As a result, Feminist Relational Contract Theory is arguably more appropriate in this context, because it combines feminist perspectives that highlight power imbalances with Macneil's relational contract approach.
Focusing on gender creates 'disturbances in the field -that inverts or scrambles familiar narratives of stasis, recovery or progress' and 'advances rival perspectives'. context is a tool that enables recognition of particular inequalities on gender lines. This is particularly useful when thinking about power because feminism directs critical fire at how social and legal structures reinforce power imbalances. By choosing to explicitly recognise this, in other words, to not be silent on the gendered dimensions of the minorities within minorities debate, issues of power are placed at the core of the discussion instead of on the margins. An explicitly feminist perspective is has often been applied to the minorities within minorities debate and is one of the most important aspects of a relational approach. This might not be obvious at first, as women in minority communities arguably are just as susceptible to religious or racial discrimination as they are to discrimination based on gender.
But a feminist approach does not only emphasise the gendered power inequalities faced by minorities within minorities; rather, it emphasises the diversity of individuals in these positions. 119 In doing so, individuals are able to resist the assumption that as members of a religious group or community, they are automatically replicating that group or community's interests and identities. as a type of social contract. 121 The advantage of recognising contractual relationships in these different ways is that FRCT opens up the possibility for the system in which the law legitimises agreements to be challenged. This is particularly important in light of Carol Smart's observation about the power law has to arrive at its own version of truth, based on norms that may not reflect the experiences of the parties to an agreement. 122 Therefore, it is not enough to employ relational autonomy in a way that highlights gendered power imbalances between parties; FRCT is needed in order to recognise that law is in part responsible for these imbalances, because as Smart has said law is 'structured on patriarchal precedents'. 123 In short, FRCT does not simply aim to operate within law to produce solutions to issues of power in contract, because it recognises that law might be part of the problem.
FRCT is required since current approaches are shaped by and perpetuate notions and values of individualist autonomy. By focusing on the autonomy of the parties, the resolution of the matter at hand still resides in the private sphere. This is arguably one of the reasons that relational autonomy is not successful in practice, because as Martha Fineman has put it, 'the characterisation of the family as the preeminent private space carries with it a set of assumptions about family relationships'. 124 The contractual approach taken by civil courts does not refer to any preference or intention expressed by the parties, rather, the parties are deemed autonomous simply because they have consented to an arbitral award being made. surrounding it but a number of interlocking relationships over a much longer period: this would include looking at the entire relationship between the individual member and the group, the relationship between the two parties the case is concerned with, as well as family and community pressures and the gendered aspects of the decision-making process and court personnel. Another important consideration would be the context spanning the whole period in which the parties were members of the religious community, as focusing on the discrete moment in which the arbitration was elected potentially leaves important contextual factors out. 132 The factors highlighted by Diduck above, such as who the religious authority figures are, to whom they are accountable and so forth would also be significant pursuant to FRCT, by or at religious tribunals will always be fact specific taking into account not just the agreement and its context but also the wider and multiple power relationships that are in play.
To date, the concern about minorities within minorities has focused mostly upon the relationship between the religious group and the State. Recent work originating from the Cardiff research has broadened this to extend the focus to group members who in Shachar's work are jointly governed by the group and the State but who also enjoy social agency.
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However, there is a need to go much further than this.
FRCT provides a means by which this could be achieved. Relational autonomy by itself is insufficient. The best relational autonomy can do is to conclude that one of the parties was not autonomous as a result of pressure from the other party, the religious group or other contextual factors, and so the agreement should not be given effect. This is too blunt an instrument of analysis since it would mean that agreements would be set aside denying the agency of the parties. It is important to not presume a lack of individual autonomy when there is evidence of oppression or systematic subordination. Diana Meyers argues that individuals experiencing multiples forms of oppression and structural inequality can still be partially autonomous and it should not be assumed they are unable to be autonomous because of 133 Above n 97. 134 R Sandberg above n 10.
and capacity to make that choice. This article, however, has explored whether the focus ought to be on the issue of autonomy rather than consent. It was found that both the focus on group autonomy in religion law and individualised autonomy in family law were insufficient but that the second did point to the need to place concerns about religious tribunals within the broader context of significant changes within family law. This family law context presented a further and preferable notion of autonomy: the idea of relational autonomy as applied in the family law context by Herring.
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Herring's work is important in that it provides an understanding of autonomy based on the forming of relationships rather than the usual focus on the autonomy of the religious group or on the individualised autonomy of those who use religious tribunals. However, this does not go far enough, and there is evidence to suggest that a relational autonomy approach does not lead to significantly different outcomes in practice. 143 By applying relational autonomy to the context of religious tribunals, a number of shortcomings with the application of Herring's work were identified. In particular, it was suggested that the term was a paradox and that important word was 'relational' rather than 'autonomy'. This led to a discussion of relational contract theory as an alternative relational approach. The way in which English law regards collective religious freedom as contractual and the trend whereby religious agreements are increasingly being regarded as contractual showed the value of a contractual approach.
However, relational contract theory was considered to pay insufficient attention to the power (im)balances that exist. This led to the adoption of an approach that builds upon both relational autonomy and relational contract theory employing a feminist perspective to direct critical fire at the power relationships that exist and are perpetuated at multiple levels.
Feminist Relational Contract Theory is preferable to the narrowly constrained notion of consent and the focus upon autonomy, even Herring's notion of relational autonomy. There is a desperate need for a change of approach in this area. The court's fixation on consent perpetuates an individualist notion of autonomy which is blind to all but the most blatant gender inequalities. As the President of the Family Law Division has said, 'it can only be in the rarest of cases that it will be appropriate for the judge to do other than approve the 142 J Herring, above n 24. 143 L Buckley, above n 73.
[award]'. 144 This means that there is a very high threshold before the court will inspect agreements and decisions made. Feminist Relational Contract Theory could provide a way forward that uses contract to uphold and legitimise decisions made within religious tribunals, whilst recognising the instances in which individuals are not able to exercise power in decision making. This approach, created and applied in relation to prenups, 145 could be potentially applied to a number of other agreements and relationships within and outside family law. It has the potential to encourage judges (both religious and civil) to place the claim before them into its wider context, taking into account a number of interlocking relationships over a period of time and playing particular attention to the power dynamic to reach conclusions and solutions that are more ambitious than the existing binary outcomes. In an age where the concept of the family and the role of family law are in flux, Feminist
Relational Contract Theory even has the potential to demarcate the boundaries of family law, determining which relationships are subject to regulation by being the product of relational contracts and providing an ambitious way by which disputes can be resolved that recognises that relationships are both legal and social constructs.
